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Abstract
We develop a dynamic model of experience goods pricing with independent private
valuations. We show that the optimal paths of sales and prices can be described in
terms of a simple dichotomy. In a mass market, prices are declining over time. In a
niche market, the optimal prices are initially low followed by higher prices that extract
surplus from the buyers with a high willingness to pay. We consider extensions of the
model to integrate elements of social rather than private learning and turnover among
buyers.
Keywords: Monopoly, dynamic pricing, learning, experience goods, continuous
time, Markov perfect equilibrium.
JEL Classification: D81, D83
￿ We would like to thank Kyle Bagwell, Ernst Berndt, Steve Berry, Patrick Bolton, Sven Rady, Mike
Riordan, Klaus Schmidt and Ferdinand von Siemens for very helpful comments and Colin Stewart for
excellent research assistance. We bene￿ted from discussions at the IO Day at New York University and
seminars at the University of Darmstadt, EUI, LSE, University of M￿nchen, University of N￿rnberg, IUI,
University of Oulu, and UCL. The ￿rst author gratefully acknowledges ￿nancial support from NSF Grant
SES 0095321 and DFG Mercator Research Professorship at the Center of Economic Studies at the University
of Munich. The second author gratefully acknowledges support from ESRC through grant R000223448.
yDepartment of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520-8268, U.S.A.,
dirk.bergemann@yale.edu.




Since the original contribution by Nelson (1970), experience goods have been de￿ned as
those goods whose true quality is only learned upon consumption. As a result, any con-
sumer choice model of experience goods must combine the perishable goods nature of repeat
purchases with the durable information resulting from previous purchases. In this paper,
we develop a simple tractable model of optimal pricing for a monopolist that sells an ex-
perience good over time to a population of potential buyers. We ￿nd that di⁄erent types
of experience goods induce qualitatively di⁄erent long run outcomes depending on whether
the short run perishable attributes or the long run informational features of the product
are the most important in the purchasing decisions.
In an experience goods market, the seller is facing simultaneously two di⁄erent submar-
kets. The demand curve in the part of the population that has already learned its preferences
is similar to the standard textbook treatment. Those buyers that are uncertain about the
true quality of the product must behave in a more sophisticated manner. Each purchase
incorporates an element of information acquisition that is relevant for future decisions. The
value of this information is endogenously determined in the market. If future prices are
high, purchases are unlikely to yield information that results in future consumer surpluses.
If future prices are low, it may be in the buyers￿best interest to forego purchases in the
current period as future prices are attractive regardless of the true value of the product.
As a result, current and future prices determine simultaneously the sales in the informed
segment of the market and the value of information in the uninformed segment.
Our main result is that the qualitative features of the equilibrium depend on a rather
simple intertemporal comparison. When a single new consumer enters the market in its
long run full information equilibrium, he calculates his expected consumer surplus from
potential future purchases and compares that to the (possible) short run losses from current
purchases. We de￿ne a market to be a mass market if such a buyer is willing to buy at the
full information monopoly price. We show that in a mass market, the long run equilibrium
price converges to the full information monopoly price and the long run sales also converge
to full information sales levels.
In a niche market, uninformed buyers do not buy at the monopoly price. In this case,
2long run prices also converge to full information levels, but sales fall short of the full infor-
mation monopoly sales. We also show that the equilibrium price paths take quite di⁄erent
shapes in these two cases. In a mass market, the monopolist skims the more attractive part
of the market (i.e. the uninformed buyers). In a niche market, the monopolist o⁄ers low
initial prices to capture a larger share of the uninformed at the expense of targeting the
more attractive informed segment of the market.
The model in this paper is an in￿nite horizon, continuous time model of monopoly
pricing. There is a continuum of ex ante identical consumers that have a unit demand per
period for the purely perishable good. At each instant of time, the monopolist o⁄ers a
spot price and the buyers decide whether to purchase or not. In the beginning, as the new
product is introduced, all the buyers are uncertain about their valuation. By consuming
the product, they learn their true valuation for the product in a stochastic manner. For
analytical convenience, we assume that a perfectly revealing signal arrives according to a
Poisson process to the active buyers in the market. We also assume that the aggregate
distribution of preferences in the population is common knowledge. The key feature of the
model is that di⁄erent buyers become informed at di⁄erent times. As a result, the market
is segmented at each point in time and the degree of segmentation depends on the prices
that the monopolist sets. Hence the model incorporates elements of demand management
and market building.
To give a concrete example that ￿ts our model, we consider the market for pharmaceuti-
cals. Prior to launch, each new drug undergoes an extensive period of testing to determine
its performance in the overall population. The aggregate uncertainty relating to the product
has hence been reduced to a large extent at the moment of introduction. At the same time,
many drugs have di⁄erent and unknown e⁄ects for di⁄erent patients. This individual level
uncertainty provides a motive for experimentation. A recent empirical study by Crawford
& Shum (2005) regarding the dynamic demand behavior in pharmaceutical markets docu-
ments the important role of idiosyncratic uncertainty and learning in explaining demand.1
1The empirical literature on learning based models in pharmaceutical demand is growing rapidly. Ching
(2002) provides structural, dynamic demand estimates when there is learning among patients about a new
(generic) pharmaceutical with common values. Coscelli & Shum (2004) estimate the impact of uncertainty
and learning for the introduction of a new drug. The role of information is also central in Bhattacharya &
Vogt (2003), where a model and preliminary estimates regarding informative marketing for new pharmaceu-
tical products are presented.
3For a data set of anti-ulcer descriptions, they observe substantial uncertainty about the
idiosyncratic e⁄ectiveness of the individual drugs and high precision in the signals received
through consumption experience. We model the e⁄ectiveness of the new treatment to an
individual new patient as a random event. The time of response to the drug is random
and the response may be either positive or negative (successful recovery from the illness or
severe side e⁄ects).
To our knowledge, the current paper is the ￿rst to address the issue of experimental
consumption in a fully dynamic model with a population of heterogenous buyers. We
provide a tractable analytical framework and demonstrate the ￿ exibility of the framework
by outlining extensions of the basic model in Sections 5 and 6. Besides the earlier cited
work on pharmaceuticals, there is growing literature on Bayesian learning in consumer
markets with experience goods, see e.g. Erdem & Keane (1996), Erdem, Imai & Keane
(2003) and Ackerberg (2003). All of these contributions focus on the optimal behavior
of the buyers facing an exogenously given price. A contribution of our paper is then to
present a parsimonious model of equilibrium behavior with fully optimizing and forward
agents on both sides of the market. The model has a number of features which facilitate
an empirical analysis of experience good markets. In our model, the equilibrium price
converges to the static monopoly price. The true underlying demand can therefore be
estimated as in standard static discrete choice models, see Berry (1994). This in turn
plausibly allows the identi￿cation and estimation of the learning rate ￿, given the discount
rate r, or the identi￿cation of the ratio ￿=r from the dynamics of the price path. Our paper
therefore provides a modeling framework where it may be possible to extend the empirical
analysis of Bayesian learning to an analysis of Bayesian equilibrium behavior. The simple
characterization in terms of niche and mass market makes an empirical veri￿cation of the
￿t of the model feasible.
Finally, we should mention that the model allows an alternative interpretation which
we spell out in more detail in Section 6. We can rephrase the random arrival of information
as a random arrival of a consumption opportunity. With this speci￿cation, we may assume
that the buyers learn their true preferences upon the ￿rst purchase. In addition to being
commonly used in other papers on experience goods, this assumption expands the scope of
our results to markets such as new brands of cereals, soft drinks, etc. Similarly, the demand
for many professional services such as law, and internet services, often arises due to random
4events.
1.2 Related Literature
Monopoly models dealing with issues of dynamic pricing include Milgrom & Roberts (1986),
Farrell (1986) and Tirole (1988). All of these models make the assumption that the per-
ceived quality is either high or otherwise of no value and the main emphasis is on vertical
di⁄erentiation between the buyers. Furthermore, these models have only a two period hori-
zon. We view both of these restrictions as unnecessary and unrealistic in many situations.
Our model allows for the possibility that the monopolist discriminates intertemporally in
the market in a more ￿ exible manner and as a result, our conclusions are quite di⁄erent
from those in the earlier literature. In our model, it is possible that the marginal buyer in
the later periods might have a lower willingness to pay for quality than the marginal buyer
in the earlier periods and as a result, buyers have an incentive to engage in experimental
consumption. An early paper on optimal dynamic pricing of experience goods is Shapiro
(1983). In his model, the consumers are di⁄erentiated ex-ante in terms of their willingness
to pay. Every consumer learns the true quality of the product only through his own expe-
rience even though it is assumed to be the same for everybody. Furthermore, it is assumed
that (i) each consumer acts myopically and (ii) expected quality is biased with respect to
the true quality. Shapiro (1983) derives results for buyers with either an optimistic or a
pessimistic bias. The natural benchmark of unbiased buyers would yield constant prices.
Cremer (1984) considers a model with initially identical buyers and idiosyncratic experience
to explain the use of coupons for repeat buyers in a two period setting. In contrast to our
analysis, Cremer (1984) considers the optimal commitment price path and does not analyze
the time consistent pricing policy. In a recent contribution, Villas-Boas (2004) considers
the equilibrium in a duopoly model with di⁄erentiation along a location and a taste dimen-
sion. The location is known at the outset whereas tastes are learned through experience.
The subsequent analysis is mostly concerned with brand loyalty, i.e. whether buyers return
to the seller they bought from in the past. Villas-Boas (2004) presents condition on the
skewness of the distribution under which brand loyalty exists in equilibrium. As the model
combines di⁄erentiation along two dimensions, it is impossible to obtain clear and general
results about the intertemporal price path. Villas-Boas (2005) provides an extension to an
in￿nite horizon model.
5Finally, conditions for initially high prices have been obtained in asymmetric information
models of entry. In those papers, the monopolist is assumed to know the true value of the
product, and the prices chosen serve as signals of the true quality. A prominent example of
such models is Bagwell & Riordan (1991) where high and declining prices serve as signals
of high product quality. Judd & Riordan (1994) consider a model with initially symmetric
information where private signals are received by the monopolist and the buyers after ￿rst
period choices. The ￿rm then faces a signaling problem in the second period. The results
in these models depend on the details of the information revelation mechanism and the
cost structure. In our model, the results depend only on the quality di⁄erence between the
products which can in principle be inferred directly from the realized prices.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model and discusses the
appropriate solution concepts. Section 3 presents the problem of optimal demand manage-
ment for the seller. Section 4 analyzes the properties of the optimal price path. Section 5
discusses the social e¢ cient allocation and the role of idiosyncratic versus social learning.
Section 6 provides extensions of the model including in￿ ow of new buyers, and random
purchasing opportunities for the buyer. Section 7 concludes. The proofs of all the results
are collected in the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a continuous time model with t 2 [0;1) and a positive discount rate r > 0.
A monopolist with a cost of production o⁄ers a product for sale in a market consisting
of a continuum of consumers. For analytical simplicity, we assume that the buyers have
unit demand for the product within periods, and that the product is not storable. We also
abstract from the possibility of price di⁄erentiation within periods. At each instant, the
monopolist o⁄ers a spot price. Upon seeing the price, each consumer decides whether to
purchase or not.
Every consumer is characterized by his idiosyncratic willingness to pay for the product,
denoted by ￿: The good is an experience good and the true value of ￿ is initially unknown to
the buyer and the seller. The ex ante distribution of buyer types is given by a continuously
di⁄erentiable distribution function F (￿) with support [￿l;￿h] ￿ R: This distribution is
assumed to be common knowledge and re￿ ects our assumption that there is no aggregate
6uncertainty in the model. As the focus in this paper is on private individual experiences,
we abstract from possible common sources of uncertainty. To simplify the analysis, we also
require that ￿[1￿F (￿)] be strictly quasiconcave in ￿: This assumption guarantees that the
full information pro￿t maximization problem is well behaved.
All buyers are ex ante identical, and their expected utility from consuming the product





Throughout the paper, we assume that a perfectly informative signal (e.g. the emergence
of side e⁄ects in a drug therapy) arrives at a constant Poisson rate ￿dt for all buyers that
purchase the product in a time instant of length dt:2 In this case, the posterior distribution
on ￿ remains constant at the prior until the signal is observed.3 The most important
analytical consequence of this assumption is that conditional on not having observed a
signal, the buyers remain identical. After observing the signal, the buyers are heterogenous
and the monopolist￿ s key objective is to manage the endogenous composition of these two
market segments.4
As we analyze the dynamic behavior of the market, it is natural to use dynamic pro-
gramming tools to derive the equilibrium conditions for the model. We assume that the only
public observable variables in each period are the prices and aggregate quantities. This is in
line with the assumption that each individual buyer is small and has no strategic impact on
the aggregate outcomes. The state variable of the model at each instant t is the fraction of
agents that have become informed. We denote this fraction by ￿(t) 2 [0;1]: Even though
￿(t) is not directly observable to the players, it can be calculated from the equilibrium
purchasing strategies. Conditional on the uninformed buying in period t, the state variable
2It might be natural to allow for cases where ￿ depends on t: In the pharmaceutical example, such a
time-varying arrival rate might re￿ ect e.g. the decline in the probability of a treatment being eventually
successful given a number of unsuccessful trials. We have analyzed this possibility, but given that the
qualitative features of the model remain the same, we report only the constant case.
3This assumption is made for the ease of exposition only. We have also computed the model for posteriors
with positive and negative drift. Again, the qualitative features of the solution are the same as in the constant
case.
4In section 6, we give an alternative interpretation to the informational structure of our model in terms




= ￿(1 ￿ ￿(t)):
as in period t there are 1 ￿ ￿(t) currently informed buyers and a fraction ￿dt of them
become informed in a time interval of length dt.
A Markovian pricing strategy for the seller is denoted by p(￿): An uninformed buyer has
a Markovian purchasing strategy du (￿;p) that depends on the state of the system as well
as the current price. Finally, the Markovian purchasing strategy d￿ (￿;p) of the informed
buyer depends on the state, the current price and his valuation.
The monopolist maximizes her expected discounted pro￿t over the horizon of the game.
The buyers maximize the expected discounted value of their utilities from consumption
net of price. Note that as there is no aggregate uncertainty, the price and aggregate sales
processes are deterministic. The individual buyer however faces uncertainty regarding his
true valuation and the random time at which he will receive the information.
3 Demand Management
The basic issue in the introduction of a new product is the dynamic demand management.
In the early stages, most buyers are inexperienced and uninformed. Over time, the segment
of informed buyers grows. As the relative sizes of these two market segments change, the
seller adapts her policy and focuses the more important segment. More precisely, the type
of the buyer whose willingness to pay determines the equilibrium price changes over time.
With a new product, the marginal buyer is clearly uninformed in the early stages. As the
informed segment grows, the marginal buyers is more likely to come from that segment.
Optimal demand management then determines when to switch between these two market
segments. The dynamic pricing policy of the seller therefore contains at its core an optimal
stopping problem.
After the switch, the marginal buyer is informed. It is not clear whether the uninformed
buyers keep on purchasing the product. Either they are priced out of the market or they
stay in the market as inframarginal buyers. Whether the uninformed buyers stay in the
market or drop out is essentially a question of the size of the market in equilibrium.
The demand management problem of the seller is more subtle than a pure optimal
stopping problem. In the canonical optimal stopping problem, the alternatives payo⁄s do
8not depend on future policy choices. In the optimal pricing problem here, buyers are forward
looking and their willingness to pay today depends on future prices. The current revenue
of the seller therefore depends on his future prices.
3.1 Market Size
As the number of informed buyers increases in the market, the optimal price is determined
by the distribution of the valuations, F (￿). When the seller ignores the uninformed buyers,
the optimal monopoly price b p maximizes the ￿ ow revenues from the informed buyers:
b p = argmax
p2R+
fp(1 ￿ F (p))g:
Price b p is also the optimal price in the static monopoly problem where each buyer knows
his valuation for the object. The corresponding equilibrium quantity of sales is denoted by
b q = 1 ￿ F (b p).
The key comparison for the analysis is between the willingness to pay of the uninformed
buyers and the static equilibrium price b p. The expected value v of the product to an
uninformed buyer coincides with the average willingness to pay in the market. It follows
that if the optimal price b p is below the average willingness to pay, then the uninformed
buyers stay in the market and eventually become informed.
In the intertemporal setting, the willingness to pay of the uninformed actually exceeds
v in most cases. In addition to the expected ￿ ow value from consumption, the uninformed
buyer also has a chance to learn more about his true valuation for the product. If the future
price stays constant and equal to b p, then his willingness to pay is the value of a purchase
today , or :
b w = v +
￿
r
E￿ maxf￿ ￿ b p;0g. (1)
The uninformed buyer receives an informative signal at the rate ￿. If the information
arrives, then buyer becomes informed and purchases the product if and only if ￿ ￿ b p ￿ 0.
Finally, the future bene￿t of the information is discounted at a rate r. The value of a
purchase today is then simply the sum of the expected value of the ￿ ow consumption, v,
and the expected value of information, ￿
rE￿ maxf￿ ￿ b p;0g.
The monopoly price in the informed segment b p and the expected value of information
both depend on the distribution F (￿). We now distinguish between a niche market and a
9mass market by comparing the willingness to pay of the uninformed buyers, b w, with the
optimal static price b p.5
De￿nition 1 (Niche Market and Mass Market)
1. The market is said to be a niche market if b w < b p.
2. The market is said to be a mass market if b w ￿ b p.
In a mass market, the price b p is so low that new buyers are willing to enter the market.
The monopoly price b p is independent of ￿ and r, and hence the mass market condition is
more likely to occur if the rate of information arrival ￿ is large and/or the discount rate r
is small.
We can gain further insight into the notions of niche and mass market by a comparative




parametrized by variance ￿2 under a given and constant mean. In this environment, the
market is more likely to be a mass market if the variance is small, and more likely to be a
niche market if the variance is large. For small variance, the seller can increase the sales by
lowering his price just below the mean. In contrast if the variance is large, the seller prefers
to sell at a price above the mean to the upper tail of the market. The size of this particular
segment is su¢ ciently large whenever the variance is large. We veri￿ed the above intuition
exactly for the classes of binary, uniform and normal distribution (with constant mean). In
other words, for any such family of distributions, there exists a critical value ￿2, such that
for all ￿2 < ￿2, the market is a mass market and for all ￿2 > ￿2, the market is a niche
market.6
3.2 Optimal Switching
We ￿rst describe the intertemporal decision problems in terms of the familiar dynamic
programming equations in Markov strategies. We start with the simple decision problem of
5In a recent contribution, Johnson & Myatt (2004) use the distinction between niche and mass market to
investigate whether a (mean-preserving) spread of the valuation increases the revenue in the static optimal
pricing problem. They interpret ￿Advertising￿and ￿Marketing￿as providing information which increases
the variance of the valuations by the customers.
6We would like to thank the editor, Robert Shimer, who suggested the comparative static result regarding
the variance.
10the informed buyers. These buyers have complete information about their true valuation ￿
of the object. For a given price policy p(￿) by the monopolist, we can determine the value
function V ￿ of the informed buyer from the Bellman￿ s equation:






The decision whether to buy or not to buy is solved by the myopic decision rule: buy when-
ever ￿ exceeds the current price p(￿). The only intertemporal component in this equation
(the second term) re￿ ects the e⁄ect of a change in the composition of the market segments,
represented by ￿, on the future utilities. Future utilities are a⁄ected by changes in ￿ as fu-
ture prices respond to changes in aggregate demand. These changes are beyond the control
of any individual buyer and hence the myopic decision rule characterizes optimal behavior.
For the uninformed buyers, a purchase of the new product represents a bundle, consisting
of the ￿ ow of consumption and information. Their value function V u (￿) is given by:
rV u (￿) = max
n
v ￿ p(￿) + ￿
￿










The main di⁄erence between these two value functions re￿ ects the value of information to
the uninformed buyers. A purchase in the current period generates an in￿ ow of information
at rate ￿. Conditional on receiving the signal, the uninformed becomes informed. In
consequence the new value function becomes V ￿ (￿) for some ￿. From the point of a currently
uninformed buyer, there is uncertainty about his true valuation ￿. He estimates the expected
gain from the information by taking the expectation with respect to ￿. The informational
gain attached to a current purchase is given by:
￿
￿
E￿V ￿ (￿) ￿ V u (￿)
￿
:
The value function of the seller is denoted by V (￿). We describe the seller￿ s dynamic
programming equation in two parts to separate the intertemporal considerations as cleanly
as possible. The basic trade-o⁄ facing the ￿rm is that sales are made at a single price in
two separate market segments. If the ￿rm decides to sell to the uninformed buyers as well
as some informed ones, the relevant equation is given by:
rV (￿) = max
p(￿)2R+







p(￿) ￿ v + ￿E￿
￿
V ￿ (￿) ￿ V u (￿)
￿
.
11Here (1 ￿ ￿) is the share of uninformed buyers in the population and ￿(1 ￿ F (p(￿))) is the
fraction of informed buyers that are willing to buy at prices p(￿): The constraint on the
price p(￿) guarantees that the uninformed buyers are indeed willing to purchase at prices
p(￿):
If the monopolist sells to the informed segment only, then her value function satis￿es:
rV (￿) = max
p(￿)2R+
fp(￿)￿(1 ￿ F (p(￿)))g: (5)
In this latter case, the size of the informed segment, ￿, remains constant and d￿=dt = 0,
since the ￿ ow of information to the uninformed buyers has stopped. The Markovian prices
in this regime must hence remain constant in all future periods. With these preliminaries,
we can de￿ne:
De￿nition 2 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium)





problems (2)-(5) are simultaneously solved for all ￿ and ￿:
We now employ the dichotomy between niche market and mass market to ￿nd the
optimal launch strategy as the solution to a speci￿c stopping problem. We denote the size
of the informed market segment at the stopping point by b ￿.
3.3 Niche Market
In the niche market the willingness to pay of the uninformed buyers is below the static
optimal price: b w < b p. It follows that if the seller sets prices optimally in the informed
segment, then the uninformed stop buying. In consequence, the seller has to decide how
long she wishes to serve the uninformed market segment.
We now describe the marginal conditions which characterize the stopping point b ￿. After
reaching b ￿, the optimal dynamic price equals b p. At the stopping point, the uninformed
buyers purchase the new product for the last time. Their willingness to pay at the stopping
point is therefore exactly equal to b w. At the stopping point, the seller must be indi⁄erent
between charging b p or b w:
b ￿(1 ￿ F (b p)) b p = ((1 ￿ b ￿) + b ￿(1 ￿ F (b w))) b w +
￿(1 ￿ b ￿)
r
(1 ￿ F (b p)) b p: (6)
12The indi⁄erence condition compares the revenue from b p relative to revenue from b w.
If the seller were to o⁄er b p, then only those informed buyers who have a true valuation
￿ ￿ b p purchase the product, leading to a sales volume of b ￿(1 ￿ F (b p)). On the other hand,
if the seller were to o⁄er b w, then all uninformed buyer would stay in the market and all
informed buyers with ￿ ￿ b w would also buy the object leading to a larger sales volume
of (1 ￿ b ￿) + b ￿(1 ￿ F (b w)). At price b w, ￿(1 ￿ b ￿) currently uninformed customers become
informed and hence they will add to the revenue from the informed customers for all future
periods. If we denote by ￿ (p;￿) the ￿ ow pro￿t to the monopolist from price p when ￿ is
the fraction of informed buyers, then the above equation can be written as
￿ (b p; b ￿) ￿ ￿ (b w; b ￿) =
￿(1 ￿ b ￿)(1 ￿ F (b p)) b p
r
: (7)
The left hand side represents the di⁄erential gains from extracting surplus from the informed
agents and the right hand side represents the bene￿ts from building up future demand.
The latter is the long term gain from an additional in￿ ow of ￿(1 ￿ ￿) informed buyers of
whom (1 ￿ F (b p)) are willing to purchase at price b p. As the right hand side is positive,
we conclude that with niche markets, the monopolist sacri￿ces current pro￿ts to build up
future demands.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Stopping in the Niche Market)
If b w < b p, then
1. b ￿ < 1:
2. b ￿ is increasing in ￿ and decreasing in r.
In the calculation of b ￿, the buyers￿optimality conditions are re￿ ected only through b w:
As a result, it is quite straightforward to extend the model to allow for di⁄erent discount
factors for the buyers and the seller. The discount rate of the buyer determines b w through
(1) and the seller￿ s discount rate determines the long run gains from additional goodwill
customers. In Sections 5 and 6, we formulate models of social learning and random purchas-
ing opportunities where the separability of the problems with respect to di⁄erent discount
rates is useful.
133.4 Mass Market
Initially, the informed segment does not exist. The monopolist o⁄ers prices which leave the
uninformed agents just indi⁄erent between buying and not buying. The monopolist thus
extracts initially all the surplus from the current purchases of the uninformed agents. As
the informed segment grows, any price which leaves the uninformed indi⁄erent, results in
revenue losses in the informed segment relative to pricing at b p. The monopolist￿ s problem
is therefore to determine the point at which she starts to leave surplus to the uninformed
buyers.
In contrast to the niche market, the uninformed buyers continue to purchase in the mass
market. After the stopping point, they become inframarginal rather than marginal buyers.
As a result, the optimal stopping condition can be described in terms of the ￿ ow revenue
for the seller. Until the stopping point b ￿, uninformed buyers are marginal. In consequence,
the equilibrium price makes the uninformed buyer just indi⁄erent between buying or not
buying. We can express this in terms of the equilibrium value function of the buyer, using
(3):
p(￿) = v + ￿
￿
E￿V ￿ (￿) ￿ V u (￿)
￿
. (8)
The ￿ ow revenue of the seller at a given price p and a fraction ￿ of informed buyers is:
￿ (p;￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)p + ￿(1 ￿ F (p))p, for p ￿ p(￿). (9)
The seller sets prices to make the uninformed customers marginal as long as the marginal




As long as the uniformed buyer is the marginal buyer, the marginal ￿ ow revenue @￿=@p
at p = p(￿) can well be strictly positive. This is because the true payo⁄ function has a
discontinuity at p = p(￿) re￿ ecting the positive mass of uninformed buyers that drop out
of the market at prices above p(￿):The optimal stopping point b ￿ is hence derived from:
@￿ (p(b ￿); b ￿)
@p
= 0.
Even though the stopping condition can therefore be expressed in terms of the ￿ ow
revenues, the problem contains an intertemporal element as the equilibrium price p(￿)
14before and at the stopping point is based on the equilibrium continuation values, see (8)).





This equation is a static optimization condition, but the dynamics of the model still enter
into the determination of prices through the evolution of ￿:
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Stopping in the Mass Market)
If b w ￿ b p, then:
1. b ￿ ￿ 1:
2. b ￿ is decreasing in ￿ and increasing in r:
If we consider the comparative static results in Proposition 1 and 2, then it is worth
observing that the respective stopping points for niche and mass market move in opposite
directions as a function of ￿ and r. Consider a distribution F (￿) with the property that
the nature of the market depends on the values of ￿ and r: For very low values of ￿, the
willingness to pay by the uniformed is low, the market is a niche market, learning stops
early and few buyers become informed. As ￿ increases, the uninformed buyers are willing
to pay more. In turn the seller o⁄ers introductory prices for a longer period. Eventually
￿ will reach a point where the willingness to pay of the uninformed exactly equals the
static optimal price, or b w = b p. At this knife-edge case the optimal dynamic price is, in
fact, constant and b ￿ = 1. For higher ￿; the market turns from a niche market into a mass
market. The willingness to pay of the uniformed is now high enough for them to stay in
the market until they become informed. In consequence, the uniformed buyer becomes an
inframarginal buyer. The stopping point b ￿ now decreases in ￿ as the uninformed customers
become inframarginal earlier. The comparative statics are simply reversed for r. In Figure
1, the increasing part of the graph corresponds to the niche market case and the decreasing
part belongs to the mass market.
Figure 1: Stopping Point for Varying ￿
r.
154 Equilibrium Pricing
We are now in a position to characterize the complete equilibrium pricing policy on the
basis of the equilibrium stopping point. Before the stopping point b ￿, the marginal buyer is
the uniformed buyer. We showed earlier that the price before stopping is:
p(￿) = v + ￿E(V ￿ (￿) ￿ V u (￿)). (10)
We ￿rst discuss the pricing policy in the early market and then describe the equilibrium
conditions for the mature market.
Proposition 3 (Early Market)





= r(p(￿) ￿ v) ￿ ￿E￿ maxf￿ ￿ p(￿);0g: (11)
2. p(￿) is decreasing in ￿ for all ￿ < b ￿.
3. q (￿) is initially decreasing and convex in ￿.
The di⁄erential equation (11) describes the evolution of the price in the early market. By
rearranging the equality (11), it becomes apparent that the di⁄erential equation represents
the trade-o⁄ of the uninformed buyer in his current purchase decision:






The left hand side represents the net bene￿t of buying the new product today rather than
tomorrow. In particular, a purchase today generates an informative signal at rate ￿ and
allows the buyer to make an informed decision. The right hand side represents the net
bene￿ts of buying tomorrow rather than today. This bene￿t has two components. First,
buying tomorrow allows the buyer to postpone the net cost of a purchase, p(￿) ￿ v; and
second, the price to be paid changes.
Proposition 4 (Mature Market)
1. In the niche market, p(￿) jumps up and stays at p(b ￿) = b p at the stopping point b ￿.
162. In the mass market, p(￿) is decreasing for all ￿ ￿ b ￿ and lim￿!1 p(￿) = b p.
The value of information before the stopping point, is decreasing over time. While the
price dynamics is governed by the same di⁄erential equation for the niche and the mass
market, the source of the decrease in the value of information is di⁄erent in the niche and
the mass market. In the niche market,a phase of introductory prices ends at the stopping
point. After this, the seller increases her price to b p and a large fraction of surplus extracted
from the informed buyers. Hence the initially high value of information results from the
relatively low initial prices.
In the mass market, the seller stops extracting all the surplus from the uninformed
buyers and lowers her price to attract more informed buyers with lower valuations for the
object. The value of information is now decreasing because with lower future prices, the
option value that arises from the possibility of rejecting the product when ￿ is low is smaller.
Our interpretation of the two qualitatively di⁄erent price path goes as follows. In the
niche market, the monopolist makes introductory o⁄ers to increase the number of goodwill
customers once the price is raised. In the mass market, the monopolist skims the high
valuation buyers in the market (the uninformed buyers) with a high and declining price. It
should be noted that in the niche as well as in the mass market, the prices do not change
by large amounts before b ￿ and as a result, adjustment costs to changing prices might well
force the monopolist to adopt a two price regime with low initial prices followed by higher
prices in the niche market, and high prices followed by low prices in the mass market.
The intertemporal pricing policies are graphically depicted in Figures 2 and 3 for niche
and mass market, respectively. With the niche market, the introductory price slowly de-
creases until it reaches a value equal to the willingness to pay and at that point, the seller
ceases to pursue new customers and sells only to informed customers with su¢ ciently high
valuations. In the mass market, the discount factor r is small, and hence the option value
for the uninformed buyer is almost constant. In consequence, the price declines very slowly
until the seller begins to seek sales more aggressively from the informed customers. At
this point, the price begins to decrease more rapidly and eventually converges to the static
monopoly price.
Insert Here Figure 2: Equilibrium Price for Niche Market
Insert Here Figure 3: Equilibrium Price for Mass Market
17Notice also that our model provides a theoretical prediction for the joint movements
of prices and equilibrium quantities. These e⁄ects should be taken into account when
estimating the demand for new products. If one estimates a static demand function for
a product using data that includes observations of prices for ￿ < b ￿; it is clear that the
resulting estimators are biased.
5 Idiosyncratic versus Social Learning
We now contrast the equilibrium allocation with the socially e¢ cient allocation. In the
presence of idiosyncratic learning, the socially e¢ cient outcome can be implemented in
a competitive equilibrium with marginal cost pricing. We then augment the analysis of
idiosyncratic learning with an element of social learning. The social learning naturally
introduces informational externalities among the buyers and we show that the earlier welfare
ranking between competitive and monopolistic market structure may be reversed in the
presence of social learning.
5.1 Social E¢ ciency
The socially e¢ cient policy maximizes the sum of the expected discounted value across
all agents. As learning and the resolution of uncertainty is purely idiosyncratic, the so-
cially optimal policy can be determined as the solution for a representative consumer. The
buyers and the seller have quasilinear preferences and hence socially e¢ cient policy simply
maximizes expected social surplus. The optimal consumption policy can be determined
for informed and uninformed consumer separately. For a given constant marginal cost c of
producing the object, the (social) value function W￿ of the informed customer is:
rW￿ = maxf￿ ￿ c;0g,










For the informed consumer, the socially e¢ cient decision is simply to consume if and only
if his net value ￿￿c is positive. For the uninformed consumer, he should buy if the current
18social net bene￿t, v￿c and the future social net bene￿t, ￿E
￿
W￿ ￿ Wu￿
, exceeds zero. The








E￿ maxf￿ ￿ c;0g. (13)
By inserting the value function for the informed consumer, or (13) into (12), we obtain the
critical value v so that the social value of consuming an additional unit of the new good is




E￿ maxf￿ ￿ c;0g ￿ c.
The socially optimal policy is therefore to consume the new good as long as the expected
net value today, v ￿ c, and the value of information from current consumption is positive.
It is worth emphasizing that it may be e¢ cient to try the new product even if the expected
net value of the object, v ￿ c, or even the expected gross value v, are negative.
The monopoly position of the seller introduces static as well as intertemporal distortions
away from the socially optimal level of consumption. The static element of the distortion
come from the standard revenue consideration of the seller. Her objective is to maximize the
revenue rather than the social welfare. In consequence, she will typically set the price above
marginal cost and hence fail to o⁄er the product to some buyers who would have a positive
contribution to the social surplus. The dynamic element of the distortion arises in the niche
market as well as in the mass market, but with di⁄erent consequences. In the niche market,
the willingness to pay of the uninformed is low and hence the seller will eventually stop
selling to the uniformed in pursuit of higher per unit revenue from the informed buyers. In
the mass market, e¢ cient learning takes place. But as the uninformed agents are willing
to pay a premium over and above their expected value for the object, the seller maintains
a high price even relative to static monopoly price b p. This implies that during the launch
phase, many informed buyers will not purchase the object even though their purchase would
generate a positive social surplus.
In contrast to this, a competitive market would support the e¢ cient allocation in this
model of idiosyncratic learning. In a competitive market, the object is o⁄ered at the mar-
ginal cost c. In consequence, the objective function of the buyer in a competitive market
coincides with the social objective both for the informed and the uniformed consumer. The
important ingredient of the model which leads to an agreement of the competitive and the
e¢ cient outcome is the idiosyncratic nature of the learning experience. We next discuss a
19minimal extension of our model to introduce an element of social learning. We shall see
that the qualitative insights of the equilibrium analysis will essentially carry over, but that
the welfare comparison between competitive and monopoly market will now be di⁄erent.
5.2 Social Learning
We introduce social learning into our model by replacing each individual buyer with a group
of k buyers who agree on value of the good. The group can be interpreted as a family, a
department, or a neighborhood where individuals have similar preferences and the ability
to communicate. At each point in time, one buyer is selected from the group of k members
to consider a purchase. The buyer bears the cost and enjoys the bene￿ts from the purchase
privately. The information resulting from his purchase is assumed to be shared within the
group.
The equilibrium conditions of the previous idiosyncratic learning model are easily adapted
to accommodate this form of social learning. The value function V ￿ (￿) of an informed agent
is given by:
rV ￿ (￿) =
1
k






The only change from the earlier formulation is that the frequency of purchases is reduced
by factor 1=k. Similarly, the value function of an uninformed buyer is given by:





v ￿ p(￿) + ￿
￿


















The element of social learning enters the dynamic programming equation of the individual
buyer as he now has two sources of information: he can either directly purchase the product
as an occasion arises (at the rate 1=k) and he can bene￿t from the information generated
by the other members of the group (at the rate k ￿ 1=k).
Social learning has two e⁄ects on optimal pricing. First, the uninformed buyers are
less willing to pay a premium for the information, as there is a chance to learn from the
experiences of others. Second, the seller is willing to sponsor the experiment of each agent
as she knows that the information will spread among all members of the group. If they
value the object su¢ ciently highly, the seller can extract some of their surplus in the future.
For the individual buyer, the probability 1=k of making the purchase, acts as an increase in
the discount rate. From the point of view of the seller, the actual market size in each period
20remains unchanged. In consequence, the stopping conditions for b ￿ are determined by using
a modi￿ed discount rate r ￿k for the buyer. In consequence, the basic distinctions in terms
of launch strategies remain unchanged and the equilibrium policies of the seller are exactly
as if he would face buyers with a larger discount rate.
With this informational externality, the comparison between the competition and monopoly
becomes quite di⁄erent. The monopolist partially internalizes the informational externality
as she understands that new information today leads to a higher revenue in future peri-
ods. In a competitive setting, the product is o⁄ered at marginal cost in each period. As
each buyer only takes into account the private bene￿ts from learning, the social optimum
may not be reached in the competitive market. In particular, if the expected value of the
current consumption v falls below marginal cost c, then the only reason to purchase the
product is to acquire more information. If the informational externality between the buyers
is increased by increasing k; then the uninformed will not purchase at the marginal cost
pricing. The socially optimal policy is independent of k, and the size of the market for the
monopolist is independent of k as well. It follows that the monopolist may now sustain the
market and induce socially bene￿cial learning even though the competitive market cannot
do so.7
Proposition 5 (Monopoly versus Competitive Market)
If v < c and it is socially e¢ cient to adopt the new product, then
1. there exists ￿ k > 0 such that for all k ￿ ￿ k, the new product is never sold in the
competitive market;
2. if v￿c+ ￿
r b p(1 ￿ F (b p)) > 0; then it is optimal for the monopolist to launch the product
for all k:
6 Extensions
Random Purchases We ￿rst describe an alternative interpretation for the informational
structure of our basic model. We assume as before that there is a continuum of buyers that
are initially uncertain about their tastes for the new product. In contrast to the basic
model, we now assume that the consumption opportunities arrive at random time intervals.
7The proof of this result is standard and therefore omitted.
21For analytical convenience, we assume that these arrivals follow a Poisson process with
parameter ￿:
In this reformulation of the model, it makes sense to assume that the buyers learn their
true tastes upon consuming the ￿rst unit of the good. Even though this assumption is less
realistic in the context of the pharmaceuticals market, it my ￿t better to consumer goods
such as cereals, cosmetics, etc. In the initial periods, the monopolist is facing demand
mostly from uninformed buyers. The fraction of repeat buyers increases as the good stays
in the market and eventually most of the buyers are repeat buyers. The only change in the
dynamic programming formulations is the random purchase rate which acts like an increase
in the discount rate. The problem of the informed buyers is now:






Correspondingly, the value function of the uninformed buyers is given by:






These two value functions correspond to the original model where the buyers￿discount
rate is set to r+￿
￿ and the arrival rate of information is set to 1. As was explained in section
3, the analysis of the original model can be carried out with di⁄erent interest rates for the
buyers and the seller and hence this alternative interpretation is included as a special case
of the original model.
Stationary Model The current model describes the optimal pricing for the introduction
of a new product. The buyers started with ex ante identical information regarding the
new product and over time their personal experiences lead them to have heterogeneous and
idiosyncratic valuations. It is then natural to expand the scope of our analysis to a market
with a constant in￿ ow and out￿ ow of consumers. In fact, many consumer products face a
constant renewal in their customer base, either because of the ageing of the customers or
other systematic changes to the agents￿preferences. In Bergemann & Valimaki (2004), we
analyze the steady state equilibrium in a market with idiosyncratic learning. We model the
change in the population by constant entry rate ￿ of new customers and equal exit rate
￿ of old customers. The new customers are all initially uninformed and become informed
according to the same information technology as in the current paper.
22The steady state equilibrium with a constant renewal of customers displays the same
basic features as the current model of the launch of a new good to an entirely new market.
The willingness to pay of the new customers is modi￿ed in the obvious way by the birth
and death rate ￿, or
b w = v +
￿
r + ￿
E￿ maxf￿ ￿ b p;0g:
With this modi￿cation, the optimal policy can again be described in terms of mass market
versus niche market. If, as before, the complete information price b p is below b w, then the
market is a mass market, and the seller will o⁄er a price in between the statically optimal
price b p and the willingness to pay of the new customers, b w, so as to balance his revenue
management. Importantly, all new customers will enter the market and learn more about
the new product.
If, on the other hand, the willingness to pay is below the statically optimal price, or
b p < b w, then we are again in the situation of a niche market. Now, the seller does want to
sell to the new customers all the time, but rather extract surplus from the informed agents.
Yet, with a constant in￿ ow of new customers, the seller cannot abandon the new customers
altogether as this would imply a diminishing customer base. The resolution of the trade-o⁄
is that the seller o⁄ers probabilistically both low and high prices. The high price is given by
b p and optimally extracts surplus from the informed agents and the low price allows the new
customers to learn and become acquainted with the new product. In this way, the seller
balances revenue objectives, yet maintains a constant informed clientele for his product. The
dispersed prices in the niche market are common in models of durable goods with entry of
new buyers (see for example Sobel (1991)). In our setting, the product is e⁄ectively a
bundle, consisting of perishable element in form of the immediate consumption bene￿t, but
also a durable element in form of the information obtained with the purchase. From this
perspective, the relationship to the durable good pricing problem appears inherently.
Uniqueness of Equilibrium The equilibrium analysis in this paper focused on the no-
tion of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium and derived the unique equilibrium in this class. The
uniqueness result extends to a much larger class of equilibria. In Bergemann & Valimaki
(2004) we show that the MPE remains the only sequential equilibrium outcome as long as
the information sets of the players include only their own past actions, observations, and
the aggregate market data. With this much weaker restriction, the continuation paths of
23play are still independent of the choices of any individual buyer but they may depend on
past prices in an arbitrary manner.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the optimal sales policy of a monopolist in a model
of experience goods is qualitatively di⁄erent depending on whether the market is a mass
market or a niche market. In a niche market, it is in the monopolist￿ s best interest to build
up a su¢ cient base of goodwill clientele. To achieve this, the monopolist sacri￿ces current
pro￿t by pricing low in order to ￿nd new future buyers. The durability of information about
the product quality thus plays a key role in this situation. In a mass market, managing
information is less important as the uninformed buyers are willing to buy at the static
optimal prices. In this case the monopolist￿ s optimal price path can be seen as an attempt
to skim the uninformed segment of the market until the informed segment becomes large.
We have kept the model as simple as possible in order to highlight the dynamics of price
setting. The modeling strategy of the current paper could be used to investigate models
with more general speci￿cations for either the buyers￿valuations of the product or the
strategic environment. An interesting instance of a more general demand structure would
be one where the buyers di⁄er in their willingness to pay for quality, but the perceived
quality is idiosyncratic and must be learned over time. Regarding the competitive structure
of the model, the natural next step would be consider the role of idiosyncratic learning in a
strategic environment against either a known or similarly unknown product. An interesting
variation of the current model and of special importance for the pharmaceutical market
would be to consider optimal pricing when a competitor will only appear in T periods
hence, induced by the expiration of the patent, see Berndt, Ling & Kyle (2003) for an
empirical analysis of this situation.
8 Appendix
The appendix collects the proofs of all the results in the main body of the paper. For
notational convenience, we shall adopt a standard notation from probability theory by
24writing:
(￿ ￿ p)
+ , maxf￿ ￿ p;0g.
Proof of Proposition 1. (1.) The optimal stopping point is given as a solution to (6)
by:
b ￿ =
b w + ￿
r b p(1 ￿ F (b p))





For simplicity we de￿ne ￿ , ￿
r, and with this we rewrite equation (16) as:
b ￿ =
b w + ￿b p(1 ￿ F (b p))
b w + (1 + ￿) b p(1 ￿ F (b p)) ￿ b w(1 ￿ F (b w))
; (17)
which shows that b ￿ < 1 since b p(1 ￿ F (b p)) ￿ b w(1 ￿ F (b w)) > 0.








v + ￿E(￿ ￿ b p)
+￿
+ b p(1 ￿ F (b p))(1 + ￿)
￿
= v + ￿E(￿ ￿ b p)
+ + ￿b p(1 ￿ F (b p)): (18)
Di⁄erentiating the equality (18) implicitly with respect to ￿ yields:
db ￿
d￿
(b wF (b w) + b p(1 ￿ F (b p))(1 + ￿)) + b ￿
￿
(b wf (b w) + F (b w))E(￿ ￿ b p)
+ + b p(1 ￿ F (b p))
￿
= E(￿ ￿ b p)





E(￿ ￿ b p)
+ (1 ￿ b ￿F (b w) ￿ b ￿b wf (b w)) + (1 ￿ b ￿) b p(1 ￿ F (b p))
b wF (b w) + b p(1 ￿ F (b p))(1 + ￿)
:
The denominator is clearly positive. For the numerator, we observe that 1 ￿ b ￿F (b w) ￿
b ￿b wf (b w) is the derivative of the pro￿t function p(1 ￿ b ￿ + b ￿(1 ￿ F (p))) evaluated at b w,
which is positive by the assumed quasiconcavity of p(1 ￿ F (p)) together with the fact that
b w < b p. Therefore, the numerator is also positive, as needed.￿
Proof of Proposition 2. (1.) Suppose that for all ￿ ￿ b ￿, the marginal buyer is an
informed buyer. The equilibrium price p(￿) is then given as the solution of the static
revenue maximization problem (9). The value function of an informed buyer at ￿(t) = ￿
is:
V ￿ (￿) =
Z 1
t
e￿r(￿￿t) (￿ ￿ p(￿(￿)))
+ d￿;














In contrast the value function of the uninformed informed buyer for a particular realization
T ￿ t of the signal arrival time, is given by:
Z T
t









The value function of the uninformed buyer is obtained from (19) by taking the expectation







e￿r(￿￿t) (v ￿ p(￿(￿)))d￿ +
Z 1
T




The willingness to pay for all ￿ ￿ b ￿ is given by:
w(￿) = v + ￿
h
E￿V ￿ (￿) ￿ V u (￿)
i
.
The di⁄erence in the value functions, E￿V ￿ (￿) ￿ V u (￿), can therefore be written, using
the above expressions as:







e￿r(￿￿t) (p(￿(￿)) ￿ ￿)
+ d￿dF (￿)￿e￿￿TdT: (20)
The gain of the informed vis-a-vis the uninformed buyer, arises in all those instances where
the uninformed buyer accepts the o⁄er by the seller even though his true valuation is below
the equilibrium price. It follows that w(￿) is decreasing in ￿ (and t) as p(￿) is decreasing
in ￿ (and t). We can then run w(￿) backwards as long as w(￿) ￿ p(￿).
The stopping point b ￿ is the smallest ￿ at which
w(￿) = p(￿). (21)
We next argue that there is a unique stopping point b ￿, by showing that w(￿) and p(￿) are
single crossing. By hypothesis of b w > b p, we have





26The maximal willingness to pay, w(￿); is a constant v and a discounted average over future
prices p(￿), represented by (20). It therefore follows that, provided p(￿) is monotone,
￿ ￿p0 (￿)
￿
￿ > w0 (￿);
which together with (22) is su¢ cient to guarantee existence and uniqueness of the stopping
point.
(2.) We observe ￿rst that p(￿) is independent of r. It follows that r a⁄ects the
expression, E￿V ￿ (￿) ￿ V u (￿), only through discounting. As an increase in r decreases
w(￿), it follows that the intersection (21) is reached later and thus at a higher value of b ￿.
The argument for ￿ is similar except for the obvious reverse in the sign.￿
Proof of Proposition 3. (1.) We obtain the di⁄erential equation by di⁄erentiating p(￿)


















We can then replace the ￿rst derivatives of the value function of informed and uninformed
agent by using the dynamic programming equations, (2) and (3). After cancelling redundant
terms we arrive at the di⁄erential equation (11) for the price p(￿).The equation (11) for the
full extraction prices has a unique rest point, _ p(t) = 0, at p(t) = w as w uniquely solves:
0 = r(w ￿ v) ￿ ￿E￿ maxf￿ ￿ w;0g.
(2.) We show the monotonicity of p(￿) separately for b p < b w and b p ￿ b w. We start with
the later case and argue by contradiction. Thus suppose that p(0) > w, then p(￿) > w > b w
for all ￿. It follows that at ￿ = b ￿, we have p(b ￿) > w > b w, but at a(t) = b ￿ we have to
have p(b ￿) = b w for the uninformed buyer to be willing to buy and this leads to the desired
contradiction.
Consider then b p < b w and consequently b p < w < b w. Suppose that p(0) > w and hence
by the di⁄erential equation p(￿) > w for all t with ￿ < b ￿. We also recall that as the
equilibrium price path is continuous, it follows that at ￿ such that p(￿) = w > b p, we have
w(￿) > p(￿). From Proposition 2 we recall that the equilibrium during the full extraction
phase satis￿es
p(￿) = v + ￿
h











e￿r(￿￿t) (p(￿(￿)) ￿ ￿)
+ d￿dF (￿)￿e￿￿TdT:
For notational ease we shall denote by R(t) the foregone utility bene￿t from being






and the equilibrium price is then given by










= b ￿ and decreasing there-
after. It is immediate that R(t) shares the monotonicity properties with p(t). We next
show that p(t) cannot be monotone increasing for all t < b t. After integrating with respect
to T, we get




Di⁄erentiating with respect to t we get
p0 (t) = ￿
￿






which has to turn negative as t " b t by the hypothesis of an increasing price for all t < b t and
the continuity of the price path. This delivers the desired contradiction. The concavity in
t follows immediately from p(0) < w and the di⁄erential equation (11).
(3.) The equilibrium sales are given by:
q (t) = (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿(1 ￿ F (p(t)))
as long as the uninformed buyers are participating. The equilibrium sales are governed by
the following di⁄erential equation:
q0 (t) = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)F (p(t))￿ ￿ ￿f (p(t))p0 (t).
It follows that, even though p0 (t) < 0; for all ￿ su¢ ciently small, q0 (t) < 0. The second
derivative is given by





￿2 + f (p(t))p00 (t)
i
and again for all ￿ su¢ ciently close to zero the convexity of the sales follows directly from
the decreasing price.￿
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